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It is with real pleasure that I present the first 
issue  of  Dialogues  in  Philosophy,  Mental  and 
Neuro Sciences. First, without sounding unusual, 
I want to start with a thank you to the association 
for  intercultural  and  interdisciplinary  dialogues 
“Crossing  Dialogues”. All  this  could  not  have 
been  done  without  the  fundamental  and 
enthusiastic  support  of  its  members  Daniela 
Cardillo, Ilana Bahbout, and Alessia Pizzimenti. 
It  is  thanks  to  their  great professional aid that 
this  cultural  adventure  may  now  begin  its 
history. I  would also  like  to thank the  authors 
that  believed  in  this  project  and  sent  their 
important contributions to the journal. 
Dialogues  in  Philosophy,  Mental  and  Neuro 
Sciences  is  an  open  access  online  journal 
conceived  to  give  a  significant  contribution  to 
the  developing  field  of  philosophy  of 
psychopathology  and  related  disciplines  (about 
this see  my  “An  introduction to Philosophy of 
Psychopathology”, which is available online at: 
http://philosophicalpsychopathology.blogspot.co
m).  In  a  landscape  made  of  so  many  ultra-
specialized journals it is one of the few that tries 
to  put  in  connection  authors  working  within 
different specialities that are nonetheless dealing 
with  related  problems,  such  as  those 
characterizing the sciences of mind. This is why 
we  called  “dialogues”  a  section  dedicated  to 
commentaries, which are open to anyone without 
any deadline (a distinctive characteristic of this 
journal). Unlike other journals, in Dial Phil Ment 
Neuro Sci dialogues are not restricted to invited 
authors and, above all, they can continue as long 
as there is something to discuss; our hope is that 
authors  will  take  this  chance  to  increase  the 
quality of the interdisciplinary dialogue. Another 
characteristic  of  this  journal  is  that  qualitative 
and  theoretical  research  is  welcomed,  because 
we  think  that  theoretical  problems  are  at  the 
basis of any scientific enterprise, and that often 
scientific problems are only apparently empirical 
ones, while often they are wrong questions (due 
to  the  way  the  theoretical  nucleus  of  the 
discipline  shapes  the  matter  and  the  “correct” 
ways  to  investigate  it).  Another  point  of 
theoretical  interest  is  that  although  we  value 
evidence  based  research,  nevertheless  we  are 
aware of its conspicuous number of limits. One 
of  them  is  the  well  known  lower  rate  of Editorial 
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publication  of  negative  experimental  results. 
This  is  theoretically  surprising  because  in 
science negative experiments are as important as 
those  discovering  something  positive,  because 
(leaving  aside  Popperian  falsificationism)  they 
indicate to researchers which ways are not to be 
pursued, or at least appear to be less promising 
(information of this sort are crucial  in  research 
planning).  Critics  of  the  evidence-based 
approach  stress  that  this  reduced  number  of 
published  negative  results  is  mainly  due  to 
theoretically-external influences of those groups 
of power that need to show the efficacy of their 
research  while  covering  their  failures.  This 
interpretation  is  very  often  correct,  but  the 
consequence is usually the rejection of the entire 
scientific  activity;  instead  of  joining  to  this 
“destructive” way to advance critiques, we chose 
to make something concrete to reduce this bias 
without rejecting the entire evidence-based work. 
Accordingly, a section  is specifically dedicated 
to “negative experimental results”. This will not 
resolve fraudulent cases of researchers deciding 
not  to  publish  their  results  because  they  are 
problematic (e.g., negative results could indicate 
that  their  research  program  is  weak,  and  this 
would lower the possibility of the program to be 
re-financed; or a pharmacological trial showing 
that a drug is inefficacious would be negatively 
evaluated  by  the  pharmaceutical  industry  that 
sponsored the trial).  However, any experienced 
researcher  knows  that  this  is  only  part  of  the 
problem,  because  even  when  researchers  send 
their data to a journal, negative results are more 
likely to be judged negatively by peer reviewers 
and  thus  to  be  rejected.  A  section  specifically 
dedicated  to  negative  experimental  results  will 
thus improve the situation at this level. 
Finally, we believe that the common peer-review 
has  enhanced  the  quality  of  scientific 
communication, and for this reason our journal is 
a  peer  reviewed  one.  However,  we  are  also 
conscious  of  an  important  limit  of  this 
procedure: being evaluated by peers of the same 
discipline, the author’s ideas are as much likely 
to  be  published  as  they  are  in  line  with  the 
common view of that speciality. This is part of 
an implicit dogmatic way of functioning which is 
normal  in  science  and  that  is  usually  helpful 
(Kuhn, 1963), although sometimes it turns out to 
be an impediment to needed radical changes. In 
order  to  facilitate  the  emergence  of  new 
viewpoints  a  section  called  “new  ideas”, 
deliberately  excluded  from  the  peer-review 
process, is here dedicated to those authors whose 
work  follows  original  lines  of  research  that 
otherwise  would  have  encountered  significant 
difficulties to be published. Whether these ideas 
will  be  forgotten  as  unimportant  or  will  be 
acclaimed  as  new  discoveries  or  important 
theoretical  turns  depends  on  the  readers’  free 
judgment. What  is  most  important  here  is that 
our  journal  will  help  authors  to  express  their 
position, thus avoiding some common pre-print 
selective  biases  of  the  most  original  research 
activity. 
This issue is opened by a fundamental work of 
Bill Fulford and Giovanni Stanghellini. In their 
paper they illustrate the rapid progresses made in 
the last years by the “Philosophy of Psychiatry” 
movement  in  the  context  of  international 
psychiatry.  Its  importance  for  every  field  of 
psychiatry (research, clinical activity, education, 
service organization) is now unquestioned at the 
point that, they suggest, we are in the presence of 
a Third Revolution in contemporary psychiatry. 
It is a great merit of Bill Fulford’s long lasting 
work  to  have  reported  values  at  the  heart  of 
psychiatric  debate,  and  the  article  presented 
herein  insightfully stresses  how  values work  in 
psychiatric practice, being unconsciously present 
in  every  activity  (even  the  most  “objectivist” 
ones, like labelling with a DSM diagnosis a state 
of mental sufferance). I would like to emphasize 
here  three  important  aspects  of  Fulford  and 
Stanghellini’s contribution: first, they show how 
philosophy can march together, and not against, 
science; accordingly, they “believe […] that it is 
vital  to build on rather than rejecting  twentieth 
century advances. But we also believe that it will 
be  essential  to  combine  rigorous  empirical 
methods  with  equally  rigorous  philosophical 
methods  if  we are  to draw successfully on  the 
new neurosciences” (p. 12). Secondly, after one 
Century  of  almost  complete  impermeability 
between the two major philosophical schools of  
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thought  (namely,  the  Analytic  and  the 
Continental  ones),  Fulford  and  Stanghellini 
suggest a  way to  integrate  these approaches  in 
order  to  provide  powerful  tools  both  for 
psychiatric theory and practice. I  am  sure that 
this position is intriguing for many philosophers 
while  others  could  be  more  sceptic  on  this 
possibility;  both  contributions,  above  all  if 
opened  to  a  dialogical  interplay,  would  be 
greatly  appreciated.  Third,  Fulford  and 
Stanghellini clearly show that values are always 
operating but they emerge only  when there are 
different  values  in  conflict.  I  think  that  this 
dynamic  can  be  generalized  to  other  areas  as 
well,  e.g.  the  emergence  of  underlying 
ideological,  theoretical/philosophical  and 
methodological  differences  when  empirical 
“facts” conflict with our expectations. 
The second paper presented  in this  issue  is  the 
very  interesting  Juan  Balbi’s  epistemological 
discussion  on  the  theoretical  bases  of 
constructivist  psychotherapy.  His  contribution 
follows  the  historical  development  of  this 
psychotherapic approach from its diversion from 
behaviourism  and  rational  cognitivism.  Doing 
so, he challenges the idea of a linear progression 
of  discrete  successive  periods  (first, 
computational  -  second,  connectionist  -  third, 
constructivist  -  fourth,  narrative  or 
hermeneutical). Instead, Balbi stresses that “the 
so-called  “Cognitive  Revolution”  was  not 
initially  oriented  towards  a  computational 
perspective  of  the  mind.  In  fact,  it  can  be 
affirmed  that  it  was  constructivist  in  its 
beginnings”  (p.18).  This  original  constructivist 
nucleus  was  then  obscured  by  the  successive 
“informational”  turn,  which  deviated  research 
activities  on  the  “Information-Processing 
Paradigm”. It seems that only in the last decade 
cognitive  scientists  have  significantly  revalued 
the  originary  study  of  active  processes  of 
meaning as a key point of scientific programs. 
Balbi  shows  that  in  constructivist 
psychotherapies  this  process  is  much  older, 
thanks  to  the  work  of  Vittorio  Guidano  who 
based  his  post-rationalist  cognitive  therapy  on 
some of the most advanced contributions of the 
physical and biological scientists of the time as 
well as on the work of leading philosophers of 
science  and  psychologists.  Accordingly,  he 
highlights  the  importance  of  some  theoretical 
key topics in the development of this approach, 
such as: a) the prevalence of abstraction and tacit 
activity  of  the  mind;  b)  the  notion  of  self-
organization  and  orthogenesis  of  complex 
systems;  c)  evolutionary  epistemology;  d)  the 
analysis  of  intersubjectivity  and  the  role  of 
emotions  in  the  organization  of  knowledge;  e) 
Bowlby’s attachment theory; and f) the systemic 
relation  between  affective  processes  and 
personal identity experience. All these points are 
thoroughly discussed in this paper, nevertheless 
they  are  theoretically  so  important  that  any  of 
them  would  merit  further  specific  analysis. 
Moreover, I suppose that other researchers could 
be  interested  in  enriching  the  discussion  by 
noting other theoretical influences on Guidano’s 
thought,  while  psychotherapists  working  with 
different theoretical models might open an inter-
theoric discussion. Finally, although I agree with 
Balbi’s remark that epistemological reflection is 
more  customary  among  constructivists, 
nevertheless  I  think  that  a  similar  work  of 
disclosure  of  the  philosophical  bases  of  the 
discipline  is  needed  in  general  (in  the  case  of 
other psychotherapic schools as  well as  in any 
other operative context, biological research and 
neuroscience included). All this because it is still 
substantially  valid  the  old  statement  that  “if 
anyone  thinks  he  can  exclude  philosophy  and 
leave  it  aside  as  useless  he  will  eventually  be 
defeated  by  it  in  some  obscure  form  or  other. 
From this springs the mass of bad philosophy in 
psychopathological  studies”  (Jaspers,  1964, 
p.770). 
The  third  paper  is  Gilio  et  al.’s  negative 
experimental  result  showing  that  cortical 
excitability in focal epileptic subjects is, contrary 
to current theoretical expectations, significantly 
lowered than that in the non affected hemisphere 
as well as that of normal controls. The authors, 
that  used  repetitive  Transcranial  Magnetic 
Stimulation  to  test  this  hypothesis,  clearly 
discuss possible practical and  theoretical  limits 
of  their  experiment.  Nevertheless,  this  finding 
appears  very  interesting  and  if  not  a  direct Editorial 
DIAL PHIL MENT NEURO SCI 2008; 1(1): 1-4  4 
refutation of current theory, it is yet an important 
contribution  to  re-discuss  it.  In  particular,  it 
suggests  that  neurological  events  of  this  sort 
should  be  explained  tacking  into  account  the 
complexity of  neuronal  functional connections, 
thus  introducing  the  important  concept  of 
“balance”  between  excitatory  and  inhibitory 
circuits  of  several  areas,  some  of  them  being 
rather  far  from  the  epileptic  focus.  Another 
point, which should be of  interest especially  to 
philosophers, is that in this article the effect of 
ethical considerations in the “factual” results of 
the  experiment  is  very  clear.  In  his  comment, 
Barrella  extends  the  discussion  by  further 
stressing  the  role  of  complexity  in 
neurophysiological  explanation  and  concluding 
that  a  simple  model  of  “defective”  neuronal 
functions  generally  applied  on  illness  of  brain 
seems  to  be  definitely  surpassed.  This 
conclusion, together with his example of cases of 
cortical  hyperactivity  leading  to  blocked 
functions  instead  than  “positive”  symptoms  is 
particularly  interesting  when  compared  with 
some  naïve  psychiatric  conceptualizations  of 
“positive” psychiatric symptoms as due to brain 
hyperfunction and “negative” symptoms as due 
to lesion or impaired function. 
Finally,  de  Marchis  and  Zaratti’s  new  idea 
explores  the  possible  effects  of  the  new 
communication style introduced by the massive 
use of the Internet Web. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Their  work  starts  from  sociological  and 
anthropological  research  suggesting  that  man 
could  have  entered  a  “Third  Phase”  of  his 
cognitive  history.  On  this  basis  they  question 
how this could influence not only the superficial 
communication style but rather the way people 
constructs their sense of being-themselves and of 
internal coherence through time that characterize 
personal identity. 
They conclude on the possible effects of this on 
the  emergence  of  psychopathology;  it  is 
particularly  interesting  because  it  clearly 
suggests  a  new  field  of  research  for 
psychopathologists and, above all, in doing this 
it challenges the appropriateness of old methods, 
thus  inviting  to  a  methodological  discussion. 
Future research will probably tell us whether this 
scenario  is  prefiguring  the  world  in  which  we 
will effectively live in the next future or if, on 
the opposite, the essential parts of human feeling 
and thinking will not be changed so dramatically. 
 
 
REFERENCES 
Jaspers K. General psychopathology. University of 
Chicago Press, Chicago, Illinois, 1964. 
Kuhn TS. The Function of Dogma in Scientific Research. 
In: Crombie AC. (Ed) Scientific Change. Basic Books and 
Heineman, New York and London, 1963:347-369. 